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Human rights violations at the border

Frontex is, directly and indirectly, complicit in serious human rights abuses, as numerous reports in recent years show. The agency and its director Fabrice Leggeri do not care much for the lives and rights of people on the run.

A Fig Leaf: the Frontex accountability regime

The border guard agency Frontex has a variety of internal control mechanisms that should formally guarantee compliance with fundamental rights. However, in realty, these mechanisms fail to produce binding accountability or effective control with regards the operations at the borders Rather, they are used as fig leaves and help to conceal and thus enable human rights violations.

Facts and figures

What is Frontex?

Frontex is the border agency of the European Union. As a decentralized agency, it has its own legal personality within the EU structure and enjoys great independence. Its supervisory body is the administrative board with one representative per member state and two representatives of the EU Commission. Frontex has far-reaching sovereign powers that are constantly increasing, which leads to an “independence of administrative apparatuses”. This means “an increasing independence of the agencies from political influence by the Council and the Commission”. This leaves particularly the director (currently: Fabrice Leggeri) with lot of room for his influence.

In addition, Frontex has an increasing arsenal of military infrastructure: the agency has its own operational vehicles, ships, drones and will also equip its standing army with its own weapons in the future. Frontex has spent 50 million euros on military drones from IAI and Airbus alone. The agency’s headquarters are in Warsaw, Poland. They are currently building a new headquarters there – at a cost of 140 million euros.

(1) Corrigendum: An earlier version of this text stated that the total budget was 11 billion. This figure was based on the information available at the time. According to the latest figures, the budget has been adjusted to 5.6 billion.

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What does Frontex do?

Frontex’s mandate has grown steadily over the years – and the new Pact on Asylum and Migration even reinforces this development. Frontex is responsible for the analysis, coordination and support of tasks around Europe’s borders. The agency is not only active on EU territory: Since Frontex’s mandate was extended in 2016 and 2019 to increase its competences for activities in third countries, the agency is increasingly present in the Balkan states. In May 2019, Frontex launched its first operation in a third country, Albania, followed by two operations in Montenegro in 2020. A status agreement enabling such operations was ratified by Serbia in autumn 2021. 87 Frontex officers will be deployed in Serbia. The local coordination centre of the operation is the border crossing Gradina, which has been the starting point of pushbacks in the past. It was also recently announced that Frontex is planning its first operation in an African country in Senegal.

Frontex’s main activities include:

  • Operations at the EU external borders as well as in third countries (including: direct and indirect involvement in illegal pushbacks).
  • Planning and carrying out deportations throughout the EU.
  • Upgrading local border control authorities and equipping them with important know-how (especially in the area of surveillance via alignment with European standards and systems).
  • Drawing up so-called “risk analyses” including recommendations for action such as strengthening border controls, expanding Frontex operations or increasing the agency’s resources.
How are Frontex and Switzerland connected?

As a Schengen member, Switzerland has supported Frontex financially and with personnel since 2009. Now the National Council has approved a multiplication of Switzerland’s annual contribution for up to CHF 61 million by 2027. This accounts for about 5% of Frontex’s total budget, which means that Switzerland is making a considerable contribution to the agency’s budget.

The extension of Frontex’s mandate will be achieved by adapting the EU Regulation on Frontex. This was adopted in the legislative procedure by the European Parliament and the Council. Switzerland is involved in the Council’s consultations, but as a Schengen-associated state it has no voting rights on further developments of the Schengen acquis.

The institutional interface with Frontex is mainly the Federal Customs Administration (FCA), and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the State Secretariat for Migration are also involved (especially in the case of repatriations, i.e. deportations). Swiss participation in Frontex is part of the Schengen Association Agreement: “Schengen/Dublin cooperation promotes close cooperation between EU member states and associated states in the areas of borders, justice, police, visas and asylum,” according to the FDFA website.

How does Switzerland participate in terms of personnel?

Switzerland is represented by two people on the Frontex Board of Directors: FCA Deputy Director Marco Benz and his deputy Medea Meier. In addition, Switzerland sends border guards on Frontex missions – all in all, they perform between 1,200 and just under 2,000 deployment days per year, with the number constantly rising. For 2021, 1902 deployment days were planned. These include border guards, document specialists, dog handlers and so-called return specialists for deportations. Two fundamental rights experts have also been deployed for the Frontex Fundamental Rights Office since spring 2021.

When and where were Swiss personnel deployed?

A complete overview for this doesn’t exist. Between March and September 2020, for example, four Swiss border guards took part in the Evros mission in the area of border surveillance. Evros is the border river between Greece and Turkey. The border region is a difficult-to-access and heavily militarized area. Frontex is present there with a lot of personnel and equipment – including patrol cars, but also drones – and in the Aegean Sea, even with a zeppelin as a surveillance tool.

For years, there have been reports of systematic push backs from the region, mainly by the Greek authorities but with the direct and indirect assistance of Frontex personnel. In February 2022, reports came to light that two people drowned after being thrown into the sea by the Greek Coast Guard, and in the Evros border region 19 people froze to death after they were allegedly first imprisoned and then robbed by Greek border guards and taken back to Turkey. The Greek border guards are the operational partners of Frontex forces, including those of Switzerland.

Reports of systematic violence, some involving Frontex, have also come from Bulgaria and Croatia, where Swiss personnel were also deployed. Although Frontex monitors all the areas intensively, there are hardly any reports of human rights violations from the border protection agency. The FCA also reports that its forces have never observed or reported any human rights violations.

Frequently asked questions

What is the problem with Frontex?

Instead of providing urgently needed safe escape routes, Frontex is waging an outright war against migration – while thousands of people continue to drown in the Mediterranean. Almost 24,000 people have died on their way to Europe since 2014, in front of the eyes of the best-equipped agency and its task forces – and these are only the official figures and only those assigned to the “Mediterranean” region. This despite the fact that Frontex has an increasingly comprehensive picture of the Schengen external border: it invested 147 million in aerial surveillance (Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service – FASS) and analyses cross-border movements in real time at its headquarters.

The agency also actively cooperates with over 20 countries outside the EU. An example: Frontex cooperates with the so-called Libyan Coast Guard, which intercepts migrant boats and forcibly tows them back to Libya, where migrants are held in violent conditions. It actively supports the expansion of aerial surveillance in the Mediterranean, while at the same time official rescue missions continue to be reduced.

Numerous reports in recent months also show Frontex officials participating in pushbacks in the Aegean and glaring gaps in fundamental rights mechanisms and reporting systems. These do not work and are merely a disguise, leading neither to binding accountability nor to effective control of the work at European borders.

Doesn’t the referendum endanger Switzerland’s Schengen membership?

In the meantime, Federal Councillor Keller-Suter has started the referendum campaign with the threat of a Schengen exit – she fails to mention that there are different scenarios for the “how to continue after a NO to the Frontex expansion”.

It is true, however, that the Schengen Agreement does indeed have a strict exit clause that applies if Switzerland does not adopt further developments of the so-called Schengen acquis. Nevertheless, a NO to the Frontex expansion does not automatically mean the end of Switzerland’s cooperation with Schengen, because a withdrawal from Schengen is not inevitable even if the referendum takes place. Rather, there are political negotiation possibilities to clarify the continuation of cooperation. In line with public statements in this direction, several experts we interviewed confirmed the view that the exit is negotiable. Rainer J. Schweizer, professor of European and international law, has already written something similar.

The Schengen agreements are the basis for the free movement of persons, which creates freedom of movement within the Schengen area. The flip side of this free movement of certain people, which is very much shaped by economic considerations, is the increased “protection” of the Schengen external borders and thus the ever more vehemently implemented policy of isolation and the striving for absolute mobility control. With this external border, the EU and Schengen states are creating a neo-colonial wall that makes both legal migration from third countries increasingly impossible and legal escape routes almost completely blocked.

For us it is clear: the free movement of persons will not be affected by this vote – we demand an expansion of freedom of movement. Freedom of movement within Europe is an achievement. It is about time that it applies not only to people in the Schengen area, but to everyone.

It must be taken into account that the current EU migration policy is based on militarisation, a network of camps and brutal border violence. Frontex plays an important role in this policy. No treaty justifies supporting this regime. Switzerland’s participation in this military operation under the guise of border protection is unacceptable. It is time to send a clear signal against this violent migration policy by voting NO to the expansion of Frontex.

But this referendum doesn’t abolish Frontex nor will it be able to do anything about the existing border violence?

We understand the referendum and the upcoming vote as part of different and diverse resistance against the violent EU migration policy. The vote alone will not abolish Frontex and border violence. But by taking money away from Frontex, we can use an important lever. Moreover, this vote is the first time that the EU migration regime through Frontex is being negotiated in public in Europe in this way. This is a great opportunity to strengthen the common demands – No to Frontex, Yes to freedom of movement – part of a multi-faceted resistance and networks of solidarity.

This is especially important for Switzerland, which likes to hide behind its status as a landlocked country – discussions about Frontex and the EU’s policy of sealing people off are strongly underrepresented in public discourse. Thanks to the referendum, there will now be several months of intensive discussion about what is happening at the EU’s external borders, what Switzerland has to do with it and, ultimately, a vote on the question of how the people in Switzerland who are entitled to vote want to behave about it. In addition to the vote, which is limited to a political-institutional level, we hope that as many social actors as possible will become active, that we can strengthen our networking and that the anti-border movement will emerge stronger from the No-Frontex referendum and the vote.

What are alternatives to Frontex?

We are convinced: a migration policy based on solidarity is possible. Much is already being done: Every day, people defy the violent border policies, civilian sea rescues oppose the deaths on the Mediterranean, cities in solidarity organize themselves, vehement communities put up resistance. But the responsibility lies in the heart of Europe, in Brussels and in Bern. And it is precisely for this that the referendum provides a concrete means of pressure: funding. Because the calculation is simple: without money, no Frontex.

As the Defund-Frontex campaign calculates, Frontex has invested well over 100 million euros in air surveillance since 2015, but 0 euros in naval vehicles with which lives can be saved. The campaign further calculates: If only one third of the current Frontex budget were reallocated, a separate European sea rescue programme could be created, including its own fleet. That would be one of many alternatives.

What kind of migration policy do you demand?

Firstly, we plead for legal and safe escape and migration routes.

Secondly, we need a new way of thinking and a new practice in dealing with migration: migration is not a threat, but a reality.

Thirdly, we need a different perspective on people in exile. As the mayor of Palermo put it: “Those who live in Palermo and are citizens of Palermo live by the principle that home is where you put your feet. As mayor, I make no distinction between those who were born in Palermo and those who live in Palermo.” The people who live here shape the here and now. It is important to fight together for equal rights and to work towards everyone being able to (co-)shape their own lives and the lives of society. In the current political discourse, migrants on their way to Europe are increasingly criminalized – also by the risk analyses of Frontex. This criminalisation is regulated by laws, whereby racist unequal treatment is considered legal and thus legitimized. People in exile are increasingly prosecuted as a result. An example of this is the situation in Greece, where refugees are systematically accused of being traffickers and face heavy prison sentences. There is an urgent need to decriminalize people in exile.

Fourthly, in order to combat global structural inequalities, today’s borders and their effects need to be challenged. Global problems such as global warming, environmental disasters, the pandemic or social injustice. need global solutions, not nationalistic ones. The isolation of Europe – which Frontex plays a central role in enforcing – is not a solution to this, but a racist and imperial response. In the current system, other people are endangered under the pretext of security for some. What is urgently needed are solutions based on global solidarity.

In migration policies that center principles such as human dignity and freedom of movement, there would also be room for an agency that takes care of the reception and support of people who have fled. With a budget of several billion euros and 10,000 people working for people in exile, a lot would be possible.

Sources

Reports about Frontex und European anti-migration policies

Reports about the referendum